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before possess, as to those principles of government which most appeal to us. All this is doubtless true. The hollowness of our excuse, it is claimed, is exposed, however, when we ask ourselves as a people whether we would have been willing to have spent on education and sanitation in the Philippines, without political control and without hope of economic gain, the money we have parted with for their possession. The answer must be promptly in the negative. The development of the Philippines in the fashion which we use as an excuse, we are told, renders our future punishment all the more assured, for that every Filipino whom we train according to our ideas must ask himself why our practices in the Philippines in matters of government have not accorded with the principles we maintain as valid at home. Thus he grows to be a more and more intelligent and dangerous opponent of American rule. In the end it is claimed, as manifest to all who will not shut their eyes, that the Philippines will gain their independence from us with no thanks returned to America.

If our exploit in imperialism is in violation of fundamental international law and involves, as said, a strong-arm taking of political power for economic benefits, and should seem too painful a subject to pursue, let us ask ourselves the net gain to Germany, in the long run, through the taking of Alsace-Lorraine. Assuredly this was one of the elements which made, some time or other, another Franco-German war a practical certainty. It gave an added impetus to Germany's course of military development and consequent imperialistic adventure, which would have been largely lacking if these lands had not been taken.

If we need other evidence that violations of natural right indulged in by nations carry with them an appropriate punishment, and therefore stand condemned in the forum of real international law, whatever professors may say or fail to see, let us turn to India. We find that this country, vast in population, was first seized by England for the benefit of a trading corporation, and that gradually the workings of the corporation were taken over by the English Government. It is believed that for two centuries it has been exploited, as we say in common parlance, for the benefit of England. In fact, this belief has but the semblance of truth. India has been held for the benefit of the English army; for the benefit of that small section of English society which has furnished its civil servants; for a small circle of commercial exploiters, and to the detriment of the average man of England. For what has this adventure produced? Its retention has made necessary an enormous navy and an increased army. Gibraltar, which has no proper relation to England, has been taken to keep the naval route clearer. The same reason has justified the holding of Malta, with no natural geographical or other relation to England.

Again, England, by doubtful methods, took hold of Egypt and made a subject nation of millions of people who knew England only to hate her. Aden was added to the list to help complete the line of protection. The impoverished and suffering millions of the English Islands, many of them stunted in their physical growth and mental development, attest the failure of the English in this imperial enterprise. It is true as ever, that "hell is a city much like London."

We may say all this with genuine admiration for the superior progress in establishing and rendering secure their rights England's subjects have made during the centuries. To England we owe much of the political and social advancement we enjoy and which we fondly believe superior to that enjoyed by the citizens of other nations. She, herself, has failed to carry into international relations those ideas of right action which she has been compelled to recognize as paramount between man and man, and the handwriting on the wall grows more and more distinct.

It is a dreary, sordid history we have to review when we consider the degrading growth and corrupting decay of governments which have indulged in foreign conquest—a history from which men have so far learned little and international law, as taught, has learned nothing. Take the instances which naturally spring first to one's mind. We have Spain, with its wonderful colonies, and Portugal, with a like career, each, after infinite expenditure of men and money, flattering itself with the story of its greatness, only to sink reduced to a low scale of relative standing among the nations of the world. England, in a more modern way, followed their example. We have the United States feebly tracing the same course, tormented by conscience and suffering materially. All these things have been done in the name of the glory of the kingdom, or empire, or we might claim for the United States that of the American people. Each instance has brought unearned and undeserved wealth to the rulers and to a select few. Each instance has spelt poverty and moral degradation to the immense mass. Such violations of real international law, if one's taste be not too particular, may seem commendable in autocratic government. They have nothing in common with democracy, the duty of which is to secure the well-being of the common man, above all things else.

The universal results of these attempts to subject alien and foreign nations to the rule of the conqueror, with the resultant injury and ruin of those taking this course, point to the existence of a natural law of nations infinitely more sacred than the words of the printed page.

We will be told that this may be true, but it is all too idealistic for a practical world. But practical men, ready to take momentary advantage of opportunities for material gain, have brought enough destruction upon the world. Idealism should have its day. Meanwhile we will not forget that millions of men have offered up their lives for false ideals. Our duty to discover the true ones in international affairs is imperative.

THE TREATIES, A COMPLETED JOB

On March 31, less than two months after the adjournment of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, the State Department forwarded identic notes to Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Portugal, The Netherlands, and China, advising them that this government was prepared to exchange ratifications of the treaties to which they were parties. That was the culmination of the great undertaking commenced on Saturday, November 12.

The ratification of the several treaties framed by the Washington Conference proper was accomplished in the Sen-

ate in less than a week after the vote was taken on the first one submitted. (The Yap Treaty, ratified some weeks earlier, was an outside undertaking between the United States and Japan, incident to the conference.) The Four-Power Treaty was ratified on March 24, and the others followed in quick succession.

As stated in the last issue of the *ADVOCATE OF PEACE*, the nagging methods used against Senator Lodge by the majority of the senatorial critics of the treaty were not effective in getting the votes necessary to defeat ratification. The hope of the anti-treaty men rested upon Senator Borah's efforts. His set attacks, delivered toward the close of the fight, while regarded as possessing much more force and dignity than most of the other opposition speeches, failed to destroy the margin of two or three votes the Administration forces had.

The last few days of the fight before the ballot on the Four-Power Treaty were marked by charges from Senator Borah that Paul D. Cravath, the New York lawyer, had stated that he had been told by members of the American delegation to the conference that there was a secret understanding between the United States and Great Britain. Denials promptly were made at the White House, by Secretary Hughes for the delegation and by Mr. Cravath. Senator Borah, by way of rejoinder, read into the record extracts from the reported speech of Mr. Cravath before the Council on Foreign Relations.

When the ballot was taken on the Four-Power Treaty, the Administration forces were so surely in control of the situation that excitement was entirely absent. The preliminaries were given entirely to voting on proposed reservations and amendments. Most of them were offered by critics.

One by Senator Robinson pledged the powers signatory to the treaty not to enter into secret agreements during its life. One by Senator Johnson provided that *pacific* means should be used to meet any situation threatening peace in the East, the implication being that *pacific* means should be used exclusively. Senator Walsh, of Montana, proposed that in case a conference became necessary to meet some threatening situation, all nations interested should be invited to participate. Numerous other reservations or amendments, many of them variations of those mentioned, were proposed.

All were voted down except the Brandegee reservation, which the Administration forces had agreed to accept. That reservation, made a part of the resolution of ratification, was adopted, with only two votes in the negative, one from Senator John Sharp Williams, Democrat, and the other from Senator Selden P. Spencer, Republican, both of whom favored the treaty without any change whatsoever.

The Brandegee reservation follows:

The United States understands that under the statement in the preamble, or under the terms of this treaty, there is no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense.

The adoption of this reservation is not expected by the State Department to cause any difficulty in the exchange of ratifications. There is a bare possibility that it will lead some of the nations signatory to other treaties framed at the conference to adopt reservations. For example, there have been reports that the French would adopt reservations to the treaty forbidding the use of submarines in attack on merchantmen and any use of poison gas. The reported French reservation would define the term "merchantmen."

The final vote on the Four-Power Treaty in the Senate was:

FOR RATIFICATION

Republicans

Ball,	Jones (Wash),	Oddie,
Brandegee,	Kellogg,	Page,
Bursum,	Keyes,	Pepper,
Calder,	Ladd,	Phipps,
Cameron,	Lenroot,	Poinexter,
Capper,	Lodge,	Rawson,
Colt,	McCormick,	Shortridge,
Cummins,	McCumber,	Smoot,
Curtis,	McKinley,	Spencer,
Dillingham,	McLean,	Stanfield,
Du Pont,	McNary,	Sterling,
Edge,	Moses,	Sutherland,
Elkins,	Nelson,	Townsend,
Ernst,	New,	Wadsworth,
Fernald,	Newberry,	Warren,
Frelinghuysen,	Nicholson,	Watson (Ind.),
Gooding,	Norbeck,	Weller,
Hale,	Norris,	Willis.
Harreld,		

Total, 55.

Democrats

Broussard,	McKeller,	Ransdell,
Dial,	Myers,	Trammell,
Fletcher,	Owen,	Underwood,
Kendrick,	Pomerene,	Williams.

Total, 12.

Total for ratification, 67.

AGAINST RATIFICATION

Republicans

Borah,	France	Johnson.
La Follette,		

Total, 4.

Democrats

Ashurst,	Hitchcock,	Simmons,
Caraway,	King,	Smith,
Culberson,	Overman,	Stanley,
Gerry,	Pittman,	Swanson,
Glass,	Reed,	Walsh (Mass.),
Harris,	Robinson,	Walsh (Mont.),
Harrison,	Sheppard,	Watson (Ga.).
Heflin,	Shields,	

Total, 23.

Total against ratification, 27.

Absent—Crow, Republican, and Jones, of New Mexico, Democrat, both of whom, it was announced, would have voted for the treaty.

Following adoption of the treaty, heated debate arose in the Senate, with Senator Lodge leading one side and Senator Hitchcock the other, as to whether a mistake had not been made in not including in the action of ratification formal approval by the Senate of the declaration adopted by the signatories to the treaty, in which it was stated that domestic questions do not come within the scope of the instrument.

Senator Lodge argued that the declaration was a mere interpretive statement by the plenipotentiaries who framed the treaty. Senator Hitchcock held it to be an essential part of the treaty. The matter was adjusted quietly in the end by attaching the interpretive declaration to the ratification of the supplement to the Four-Power Treaty, the supplement

being the treaty which removes the homeland of Japan from the Four-Power Treaty's application.

The other treaties were acted on rapidly, after the Four-Power "key" treaty had been ratified. On March 29, five days after action on the "key" treaty, the Naval treaty was ratified with scarcely any speeches, other than a formal explanation by Senator Lodge. Only one vote was cast in the negative, that of Senator France, of Maryland. Senator Reed, of Missouri, was absent. Senator France, who had opposed the Four-Power Treaty as an alliance that would involve the United States in war, objected to reducing the country's naval forces. On the same day the Senate unanimously ratified the treaty forbidding use of poison gas and submarine attacks on merchantmen.

The next day, March 30, the Senate ratified the Chinese customs treaty and the Chinese general treaty. Against the former there was one vote, that of Senator King, of Utah, and against the latter there was no vote.

THE REPERCUSSION OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

When Secretary Hughes' plan for reduction and limitation of naval armaments was carried successfully through the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, the world-wide desire to cut armies and navies remorselessly was given a vitality that is perplexing and worrying governments all over the world. From every direction come reports of insistent campaigns to curtail fighting forces. Sometimes it is land forces, sometimes sea forces, sometimes both.

In this country the proponents of a little army and navy threatened to rush President Harding off his feet. He wanted the personnel of the navy cut to somewhere between 80,000 and 90,000, the exact figure to be relative to the full needs of the navy after the scrapping program provided in the naval treaty is carried out. The present authorized personnel is approximately 136,000 men.

But the enthusiasts for curtailment in Congress, while willing to provide in the navy bill a personnel totaling 86,000 insist that they will provide money for only 65,000; and on the army side of the question the advocates of curtailment say the authorized strength must be cut from 150,000 men to 115,000 at the most, while the President demands an army of not less than 130,000.

CURTAILMENT MEN IN SADDLE

It is clearly evident that at this time the advocates of drastic curtailment of both army and navy are on the aggressive in Congress, notwithstanding the pleas of the President and his military and naval advisers that it will not be safe to reduce the navy in effectiveness below the ratio provided in the naval treaty, and that the country cannot safely face the future with an army of less than 130,000 men.

To the Administration's arguments as to the navy, the reply is made that the United States must have courage to take chances and lead the way for other nations; and also that, according to Administration spokesmen when the treaties were before the Senate, there is no danger of war for ten years. And to the Administration's arguments respecting the army, the reply is made that the difference between an army of 130,000 and one of 115,000 or less cannot possibly mean the difference between security and danger for such a nation as this.

FRIENDS LEAVE THE PRESIDENT

In the House, the President has won the navy fight without the support of leaders of his party upon whom he can ordinarily depend for aid in any emergency. They were, indeed, leaders of the drastic curtailment forces. But in the Senate, to which administrations have turned for help often when economy movements or other currents carried the House beyond control, the Administration still is confronted by a large group of Senators of both parties, led by Senator Borah who has demonstrated more power in the upper branch than any other individual since the inauguration of Mr. Harding.

Across the Pacific, in Japan, there is a more or less similar movement under way that seems to be troubling the government. In the February 25 issue of the *Japan Times* appears this account:

THE FIGHT IN JAPAN

The Kokuminto must again be given credit for taking the initiative in what is considered to be another national demand, and one which bears the closest relation to the demand for the cutting down of the Japanese army, writes a member of the Kokusai staff. This demand is in the form of a resolution presented in the House of Representatives and memorializes the government to effect a reform in the system of official appointments so that it may be possible for civilians to hold the offices of minister of the army and the navy.

At the present time these officials must be in the national defense service and have the privilege of approaching the throne on matters pertaining to their departments, without first consulting the Prime Minister. According to the Kokuminto resolution, the system of limiting these ministers to the ranks of admirals and generals is not in accord with present-day ideas nor with the conception of a constitutional government based upon the principle of popular representation.

Parties Cannot Oppose

How this resolution will be received by the members of the Kenseikai and the Seiyukai remains to be seen, but, in the opinion of some of those in a position to know, it is almost certain that neither party will oppose it. Mr. Ooka, of the Seiyukai, has already expressed before the House his objection to the special privilege of the War Minister and the head of the Navy Department, already alluded to. It was stated afterwards that this was his personal opinion, but not that of his party as a whole, much less that of the present ministry.

This denial on the part of the government, it is said, was for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary friction between the military and civilian officials, but it is patent to students of politics, closely following developments since the second Saionji cabinet, that it is the consensus of opinion outside the military services that civilians should be made eligible for the portfolios of war and navy, as in the case of Great Britain and other countries.

Remove Suspicion

The present limitation, as pointed out by Mr. Ooka, has proved to be a cause of suspicion and misrepresentation, subjecting Japan to the charge of being militaristic in her national policy. To effect this reform would be a task attended with no little difficulty. It directly concerns the constitution and requires the support of the privy council, and there is no doubt that the militarists and their supporters would fight to the bitter end to frustrate the proposal.

The army-reduction scheme is receiving national support and that calling for the abolition of the special privileges of the national defense ministers is also receiving wide support. Some point to the death of Prince Yamagata as marking the decline of power of the ultra-militaristic clique and as denoting a change in Japan's national administration, so as to remove all suspicion and misrepresentation to which Japan has been subjected abroad.